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ABSTRACT Miners in a blockchain system are typically rewarded in two ways - through a fixed block
reward, and by the transaction fees that are voluntarily offered by its users. As the available space inside
a block is limited, users must compete against each other by submitting higher fees to obtain this limited
resource. In this paper, we model blockchain transaction inclusion as a time-sensitive dynamic game, where
users base their fees depending on both what their competitors in the network are offering, and by their
own urgency of having their transactions approved. We then investigate the effect that mempool congestion
(the aggregate size of transactions waiting to be confirmed) and different block sizes have on the fees users
would be willing to pay. Our analysis concludes that miners have no rational reason to artificially limit the
block size, which is in direct contrast with previous research findings. Instead, we find that increasing the
block size in relation to a growing mempool both lowers the individual fees that users have to pay, and
increases the total in fees collected, which raises not only the utility of the miners, but also of the regular
users of the blockchain system.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain, Game Theory, Bitcoin, Transaction Fees, Block Size
I. INTRODUCTION
BLOCKCHAIN technology was first introduced in 2008as part of a cryptocurrency called ‘Bitcoin’ in a highly
influential paper from Satoshi Nakamoto [1]. Yet at its core,
the blockchain design of a decentralised and distributed
ledger of ‘blocks’ can be applied to a wide variety of applica-
tions, such as messaging, e-voting, and smart contracts. Cen-
tral to the security of many of the blockchain implementa-
tions is the ‘Proof-of-Work’ (PoW) consensus scheme which
requires nodes (miners) to find a nonce value such that the
resulting hash of the block begins with a network-specified
number of zeros. Whilst it’s easy to verify the validity of this
puzzle, producing the proof is computationally difficult and
expensive for miners, as they must invest their computational
power (and in turn electricity) to find the solution. As only
the longest chain is the one accepted by the network, miners
must race to be the first ones to mine a block as otherwise
they risk having wasted their resources.
A common way to incentivise the miners in a blockchain
system is to offer rewards; in the Bitcoin model, miners get
paid with a fixed block reward, and any transaction fees
provided by the users in their transactions. However, the
block reward is a limited resource; it is halved every 4 years
and has recently decreased from 12.5 coins to 6.25 coins.
Considering the increasing complexity of PoW puzzles, and
as a result the increasing costs of being a miner, all signs point
to mining becoming unprofitable in its current model. This is
where the idea of a block size change becomes promising -
increasing the block size can potentially drive down the fees
that individual users pay, whilst at the same time the overall
in fee totals collected can potentially be higher for miners.
The relationship between the users and the miners can be
described as symbiotic; miners need transactions from users
so they can make a profit from fees, whilst the users need
miners so that they can use the cryptocurrency as a service.
Whilst the intentions of each miner is to make as much
revenue as possible, it is also in their best interest to make
users satisfied - whether that be in terms of high security or
quick transaction confirmation. Users choose to pay fees not
only as a way to buy space into the block, but also as a way
to buy security; if the fees are high enough, more powerful
miners can enter the network and begin their mining process.
Nakamoto himself addressed this issue [2]: “In a few
decades when the reward gets too small, the transaction fee
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will become the main compensation for nodes. I’m sure that
in 20 years there will either be very large transaction volume
or no volume”. If the arrival rate of transactions is lower, or at
the same level as the block space, then any transaction will be
included, regardless of the fees offered, ultimately rendering
mining profitless. On the opposite end, if the arrival rate is
wildly higher than the block space, then a lot of users will
be deterred from using the service as the competition will
grow too large and their transactions will take too long to be
confirmed.
Transaction inclusion in a block can be modelled as a
dynamic game; even if the fee submitted at one time was
the largest one offered (and therefore included by all rational
miners), the inclusion of the transaction is still not guaranteed
in that block cycle. That is because other users may outbid
each other to the point where an originally winning transac-
tion is not worth including anymore, or all space in the block
has already been taken up by transactions that yield higher
fees. In such an event, a losing user can respond by either
increasing their fee in that same cycle, or holding off their
transaction in the hope that the next cycle will command a
lower fee.
Transactions submitted in Bitcoin are public and can be
reviewed by anyone; therefore, users have perfect informa-
tion regarding the fees that other users are submitting, and in
general, how many transactions are in the mempool, i.e., the
aggregate size of transactions waiting to be confirmed. This
means that prior to submitting a transaction, users know what
is the current minimum fee required for their transaction to be
included, assuming rational miners pick the highest paid fees
first.
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no work that
considers Bitcoin fee payment as a dynamic, repeated game,
where users base their decisions in relation as to how other
users in the network behave. The work in the paper presents
a game theory model that attempts to simulate the fee-paying
market competition among users as a way to find a possible
equilibrium that increases miner profitability.
It is important to note that block mining is memoryless,
therefore updating the transaction list inside the block has
no impact on miner’s odds of being the one to solve the
puzzle. Mining is also “free to enter”, meaning that miners
can start whenever they choose to and will only lose what
they invested. Users will compete for a place inside the block
during the block interval, which in the model will mirror
Bitcoin’s 10 min average. After this, the winning transactions
will be removed from the mempool, and the competition will
continue between the remaining transactions that ‘lost’ in the
previous interval, and the new, incoming transactions.
In this paper, we model blockchain transaction inclusion
as a dynamic game, where users base their fees depending on
what others in the network are offering. We then investigate
the effect that mempool congestion and/or different block
sizes have on the fees users would be willing to pay.
Our contributions are as follows:
1) We develop a game-theoretic model that simulates a
blockchain system. The novel approach here is that our
model is dynamic, and determines the worth based on
when the transaction was included, rather than only
considering transaction-inclusion within a single block
cycle.
2) Our results find that miners have no rational reason
to artificially limit the block size in a transaction-fee
reward environment, which is in direct contrast with
previous research findings, such as [3] and [4]. We
show that the total in fees gained is the same, no matter
the defined block size, and instead that the driving
cause affecting fee totals is mempool congestion.
3) We also find that increasing the block size in relation
to mempool congestion can potentially increase the
total in rewards won by the miners, whilst at the same
time keeping down the fees that users have to pay
individually; which works in the best interests of both
parties.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section II, the current
literature is put in the context as to its findings and how it
relates to the work addressed in this paper. In Section III, the
system model and the assumptions made are presented and
justified. In Section IV, the model is analysed; first, in terms
of how each variable affects the functions, and secondly,
how the model relates to the current Bitcoin environment.
In Section V, the model simulation is constructed and its
findings are presented, then in Section VI, the model is
analysed for possible equilibrium points. Finally, in Section
VII, the conclusions found are presented, and possible future
work is suggested.
II. RELATED WORK
For an introduction into Bitcoin and blockchain in general,
the white paper by Nakamoto [1] provides the details as
to how the system works, whilst Liu et al. [5] presents
a comprehensive survey on game-theoretic approaches to
blockchain analysis.
Dhamal et al. [6] studied mining investment strategies as a
stochastic game and found that miners with high costs are not
willing to invest their resources unless there is enough return
for them to possibly make a profit. This is especially relevant
since with the block reward going down, and eventually
becoming non-existent, the security of blockchain is going
to be threatened with powerful miners unwilling to work.
Houy [7], when evaluating Bitcoin transaction fees, found
that a maximum block size and a fixed transaction fee are
equivalent approaches and have the same effect on the net-
work. His research also showed that in an unrestricted block
size model the users have no incentive to pay any fees at all,
since users’ transactions will be included regardless; Li et al.
[8] found similar results in their work.
Lavi et al. [9] evaluated the Bitcoin fee market, and sug-
gested different fee-paying mechanisms to increase miners’
profitability. However, their research modelled fee payment
as a one-off game, under the assumption that users are de-
termined to have their transaction included into the very next
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block, and would gain no utility from having the transaction
be included later on - our model considers a more dynamic
utility function.
Limited research is available in regard as to how Bitcoin
will continue to function in an environment of zero-block
rewards; Kasahara et al. [10] studied the effect of Bitcoin
fees on transaction-confirmation times, and found that micro-
payments are unlikely to be viable in the future, since micro-
transaction users will be unwilling to pay high fees and will
in turn suffer from long confirmation times.
Easley et al. [11] analysed the evolution of Bitcoin trans-
action fees and deduced that Bitcoin is not going to be
viable in a transaction-fee reward system. Their reasoning
is that with a low arrival rate of transactions, fees will be
low and insufficient for miners, whilst with a high arrival
of transactions entering the network, the fees rise up, and
in turn the waiting times for less competitive users increase;
both rational justifications for users dropping out of Bitcoin
completely. Their final conclusion was that “the equilibrium
in the bitcoin blockchain is a complex balancing of user and
miner participation”, with transaction fees playing a crucial
role in such a setting.
Chepurnoy et al. [12] studied transaction fees and pro-
posed charging users for the space required to store their
transactions, arguing that when the block reward goes to
zero, this storage fee can still provide a stable income system
for miners, regardless of the mempool levels. Pierro et al.
[13] analysed the factors that influence transaction fees in
Ethereum and found an inverse relationship between fees
and the number of unconfirmed transactions - indicating that
when the fees are high, some users are willing to wait to have
their transaction confirmed.
Lin et al. [14] explored blockchain economic stability
without block rewards and proposed a mandatory fee for each
transaction which would go into a public account that would
collect the fees and then distributes a fixed reward to the
winning miner. Whilst the numerical analysis presented in
the paper shows that such a system would be effective and
negate the security and instability issues of a fee-only reward
system, our research will focus on an open environment of
a pay-your-bid reward mechanism, to model the settings of
currently prevalent blockchain systems such as Bitcoin and
Ethereum.
In this paper, similar to [4], we evaluate transaction in-
clusion in a block as an auction game, and in turn examine
the effect that a potential block size change would have on
the system. However, the novel approach taken by our paper
considers a dynamic setting, where the fees offered are based
on what other users are offering, versus the static approach
taken by [4]. The aforementioned paper found that the block
size should be determined by the variance of the fees offered:
“if the distribution is skewed towards high values then it
would be more profitable for the miner to reduce BSL (Block
Size Limit), while if more uniformly distributed then it would
be preferable for the miner to enlarge BSL”.
Similarly, research in [15] evaluated transaction fees in
an independent manner, where users do not observe other
pending transactions in the network. Nevertheless, their work
found that mempool congestion is vital to sustain blockchain
security, since fee competition will raise fees and motivate
powerful miners to expend their resources. They also con-
cluded that since miners only collect rewards from transac-
tion fees, they have no incentive to mine blocks that are not
full; which is in direct contrast with the findings from [4] that
suggested miners should leave some space empty in order to
increase total fees obtained, since in their model the fees were
based on the value of the first excluded transaction. Similarly,
research in [3] found that a rational miner should not include
all fee-paying transactions, and instead artificially limit space
inside the block to increase fees; however, their model falls
apart when the block reward is non-existent.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A conjecture can be made that in a perfect, rational system,
the variance between transaction fees will be uniform; that is,
users whose transaction are included into the block will pay
the exact same fee. This has no correlation to the urgency of a
transaction, since transactions are still restricted by the block
interval - simply paying more than others will not make their
transaction be confirmed any faster. Also, if the block size
is limited, assuming there are enough transactions submitted,
the blocks will always be full and identical for each (rational)
miner. Hereafter, we refer to Bitcoin as a unit by BTC.
To maintain focus on the transactions, a presumption will
be made that miners are honest and compliant, publishing the
block as soon as they mine it, that they choose to extend the
newest block at all times, and that the mempool is identical
for each miner. In the case that a number of transactions
have the same fee and not all can be included, the included
transaction will be picked at random.
We must note that our focus will primarily be on user
competition, not miner competition. This means that we
are not concerned with many of the additional issues the
mining process pertains; our model will abstract away from
individual minings costs and mining difficulty. We assume
that there will always be some miners in the network that
find it worthwhile to expend their resources in return for
collecting some transaction fees, and that they will continue
on with the mining process whatever the fee total amounts to.
We are also not considering mining difficulty, and the effect it
has on user adoption of the system, as a factor in our model,
simply presuming that users are content to exchange in the
system whether the total mining power of the network is high
or low.
Whilst the transaction size in bytes is varied in the real
world, without loss of validity (and for brevity), it is reason-
able to assume that transactions take up the same amount of
space. The average transaction size in Bitcoin is around 500
bytes, so this value will be fixed and constant in the model
– this averages out to around 4200 transactions in a 2 MB
block size or 7tx/s (transactions per second) in a 10 min block
interval.
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The nth transaction of a user i can be modelled as
tin = (a, b, xtx, ftx, ωtx, ktx, dtx), (1)
where a and b are the payee, and payer, respectively, xtx ∈
R+ is the total amount exchanged between users, ftx ∈ R+ is
the fee paid, ωtx ∈ R+ ≤ 1 is the worth of the transaction,
ktx is the size of the transaction in bytes, and dtx is the date
the transaction was published.
A. THE NETWORK STATE
The network state function takes into account the character-






where ϕ ∈ R+ is the exchange rate of one Satoshi to pounds
sterling, β ∈W (whole numbers) is the block size in terms
of how many transactions it can include (e.g. β = 4, 200 in
a 2 MB block), and ρ ∈ W is the number of transactions
currently in the mempool.
An important issue that must be addressed is how the
mempool will be managed, i.e., should proposed transactions
be dropped after a certain period of time? This can be crucial
to prevent spam/meaningless transactions from having an
adverse effect on the whole network, and to ensure that the
mempool is not being overfilled with unfeasible transactions.
In our model, we will assume an idealistic state where such
attacks are not happening and any transactions being put
forward are legitimate - therefore, transactions will remain
in the mempool until they are confirmed, no matter the date
of issue.
B. THE TRANSACTION FEE
The fundamental basis determining the fee that a user is
willing to pay is the worth they attach to the transaction
- this value is intrinsically personal and is based on the
patience (or impatience) of the user and their urgency of
having the transaction be confirmed. How each individual
calculates their transaction worth is quite complicated; there
is no evidence [8] indicating that the transaction fee is af-
fected by the transaction amount. In addition, the eventual
fee offered is also dependent on many external factors, such
as the block size limit, the number of transactions currently
awaiting confirmation, the competitiveness among users, etc.
Nevertheless, in practice, users would not have the complete
information to precisely model some of these factors.
Since it is impossible to predict bitcoin value in the fu-
ture (introduction of laws/regulations, business acceptance,
userbase, etc.), it is difficult to model the exact fee the
user is willing to pay. Instead, our fee equation will simply
model the probability of whether the user is willing to pay
above the smallest current fee to get into the block; if the
resultant value is above γ, then the user pays the current
fee and is thus placed at the top of the block queue. This
is because it is irrational for a user to potentially overpay
by immediately submitting their maximum fee offer, as the
eventual resultant fee for the current block cycle may end up
being lower. If the user is outbid from the block space, they
will once again submit their transaction with an increased
fee provided it is still at or below their probability level;
eventually continuing until their max offer is submitted. In
such a case, the transaction will either be included, or the
user will need to hold off for the next block cycle and try
again.






≥ γ, then ftx = mi, (3)
where ωtx is the worth of a transaction, mi ∈ R+ is the
current minimum fee required to have the transaction be
included into the block, c ∈ R+ is the network state, and
γ is the user’s inclination to pay the fee.
The worth variable will simply be a randomly generated
number between 0 (lowest priority) and 1 (highest priority),
and it will reflect the users perceived importance of having
their transaction be confirmed as soon as possible. Particu-
larly aggressive and competitive users may wish to have a
lower γ, however, for brevity, the value of γ will be fixed and
the same for all users in our model, and it will be based on
Bitcoin statistical data.
C. USER UTILITY
The utility of a player will be based on how long it takes
for the transaction to be confirmed, not on the amount of the
transactional fee paid; the fee is simply a means to have the
transaction be confirmed according to the worth attached to
it. For example, if a transaction with ω = 0.2 and ω = 0.99 are
both included in the very next block cycle after submission,
their utility should be the same; this is because the worth
only regards the personal importance of the transaction being
included, and hence a user hasn’t necessarily lost/paid more
money in fees just because they attached a higher worth to
their transaction than another user.
The utility of the user will be modelled as being exponen-
tially decreasing, with users preferring their transaction to be
accepted as soon as possible
Ut = (1− ωt)
(d−dt)
ι×p , (4)
where ωt ∈ R+ ≤ 1 is the worth of the transaction, d is
the current time, dt ∈ R+ is the date the transaction was
submitted, ι ∈ R+ is the block interval (e.g. 600 seconds in
Bitcoin), and p ∈ R is the patience of the user. In our model
the variable p will be fixed at 2e for each user, where e stands
for the Euler number, although, depending on the individual
characteristics of a user, this value can be adjusted.
One issue with our model is that when the worth is 1,
and hence the transaction will be included into the very next
block, the equation resolves to 00, which is an undefined
value. To make this model self-consistent, for ωt = 1,
Ut = 1.
4 VOLUME 4, 2016
Author et al.: Preparation of Papers for IEEE TRANSACTIONS and JOURNALS
FIGURE 1: Utility function that shows the pay-off the users
get after x number of block intervals. Here, the worth is in-
creasing linearly, from 0 to 1, and is shown on the horizontal
axis, whilst the vertical axis shows the utility gained for the
user
IV. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In this section we will first analyse each function, highlight
how each variable affects the model, and then, we will try to
find an equilibrium point.
A. UTILITY FUNCTION
We will begin by evaluating the utility function, which has
a couple of fixed variables in our model, namely the block
interval which is set at ι = 10, and user patience which
is set at p = 2e. The variables that are changed are the
date of transaction submission dtx and confirmation d, and
the worth of the transaction ωtx. Fig. 1 shows the utility
model with varied block intervals, which is maxed at 1 and is
decreasing exponentially with regards to the worth attached,
i.e., transactions with a low worth still get high utility if they
are confirmed, while high worth transactions get significantly
less utility as time goes on. After 10min, i.e., one block cycle,
having their transaction included is ideal for all users, and for
transactions with zero/low worth, having it confirmed at any
point results in a high utility for the user.
B. NETWORK STATE FUNCTION
Next, we evaluate the network state function, which has 3
variables; ρ which is the mempool size, β which is the block
size in terms of how many 500 byte transactions it can hold,
and ϕ which is the exchange rate of one satoshi to pounds
sterling. It is important to note that a higher network state
value has a negative association to users, as it means that
they’ll likely have to pay a higher fee to have their transaction
included into the block.
Fig. 2a details the interaction between ρ and the network
state value; here, ϕ = 0.00041 which was the exchange
rate of one satoshi to GBP on the 2nd May 2021 [16],
β = 4200, and the mempool size is increasing linearly from
20,000 to 168,000 transactions. As there are more proposed
transactions in the network, the users face stiffer competition
and will thus have to pay a higher fee to have their transaction
(a) Varying size of the mempool, which is
increasing linearly
(b) Varying the block size, from 1000 tx
to 15,800 tx
(c) Varying exchange rate linearly, from
0.00005 to 0.00079
FIGURE 2: Evaluating the components of the network state
function
included, which can be seen with a linear increase in the
network state value.
Fig. 2b, shows the connection between β and the network
state value, with ϕ = 0.00041, and ρ = 50, 000. As the block
size increases linearly, the network state value decreases
exponentially; as there are more places inside the block, users
are less willing to pay higher fees as there is less competition.
As the exchange rate increases, and thus BTC becomes
more expensive, the willingness of users to pay the fee goes
down, since the price of the fee increases; a decrease that is
exponential. This can be seen in Fig. 2c, where β = 4, 200,
ρ = 50, 000, and the exchange rate is being increased linearly
from 0.00005 (£5,000 per BTC) to 0.00079 (£79,000 per
BTC). It must be noted that lower individual fees do not
necessarily translate to lower revenue for miners, since this
decrease happens as a result of the BTC value increasing.
Therefore, the model adjusts accordingly whether the ex-
change rate drastically increases or not, keeping the "actual"
value (i.e. its exchanged worth in fiat money such as Pound
Sterling) stable.
VOLUME 4, 2016 5
E.Kruminis, K.Navaie: Game-Theoretic Analysis of an Exclusively Transaction-Fee Reward Blockchain System
C. FEE FUNCTION
Finally, we evaluate the fee function which contains 3 vari-
ables, ωtx which is the worth of the transaction, mi which is
the current fee being offered by users inside the block space
and c which is the network state. Varying the mi results in
users being less willing to pay the fee, as can be seen in
Fig. 3a, which goes with the idea that users wish to pay as
little of a fee as possible. Here, ωtx = 0.5, and c = 25,000;
the decrease in fee paying probability is exponential which
means that users are very open to pay the fee if it is low, but
as it goes up, they refrain from doing so unless the worth they
attached to the transaction is high.
This particular concept can be seen in Fig. 3b, where
users are very willing to pay the fee, no matter what it may
be, if their transaction is deemed urgent by them. In this
graph c = 25,000 and mi = 0.00022848, which was the
current “recommended” fee, on the 2nd May 2021 according
to [17], which amounts to around £12.89. The fee-paying
probability is shown in logarithmic scale, so the increase in
users’ eagerness to pay the fee is exponential, and goes to
extremely high levels when ωtx is very high.
Lastly, Fig. 3c shows the effect the network state variable
has on the fee function with mi = 0.00022848, and ωtx =
0.5. Here, as the network state value increases, users are more
willing to pay the fee; this can be due to a smaller block size,
or larger number of transactions being proposed leading to
more competition. The increase here is exponential, however,
the overall impact that the network state variable has on the
function in general is much less significant than that of the
worth attached to the transaction, or the current minimum
fee.
D. MODEL VALIDATION
Statistical data can be used to more accurately correlate the
model to the real Bitcoin network. Bitcoin, in the past year
(May 2020–May 2021), received around 3.525 tx/s, or 2115
tx per block interval (10 min) [18]; of those, around 2141
tx get confirmed per block, or 3.57 tx/s [19]. This shows
that Bitcoin currently operates at an optimal level, however,
if the number of tx/s increases with a wider mainstream
adoption of the currency, the competition between users will
turn more aggressive. Whilst this is likely to increase the
transaction fees and is preferred for the miners, it can have
the detrimental effect of rendering micro-transactions not
viable in the network. Moreover, it can take a long time for
transactions to be confirmed [10] which can affect the utility
of users.
In the same period (May 2020–May 2021), the BTC to
GBP exchange rate was on average £24490 per 1 bitcoin
[16], the average transaction fee in BTC was 0.00033984,
whilst the median was 0.00016348 [20]. It is important to
note that these are the ’winner’ fees, that is, transaction fees
which were high enough to get included into the block. In
order to find a fair ω value, it must be based on a ’winner’
value too: The mempool contained on average 31596 trans-
actions [21], therefore with a block size of 4200 transactions,
(a) Varying the minimum fee currently
being paid, from 0.000001 to 0.001001
(b) Linearly increasing the worth from 0
to 1, with the fee-paying probability
being shown in logarithmic scale of 5
(c) Varying the network state variable
from 1000 to 201000
FIGURE 3: Evaluating the components of the fee function
we find that 13.3% of transactions won, giving us a value of
ω = 0.867.
Using this data, and a block size of 2 MB (β = 4, 200),
we get a network state value c = 30718.077. With the value
of ω = 0.867, and mi = 0.00033984, the fee probability
variable in our model will be set at γ = 7905978.559, i.e. the
user would no longer be willing to pay the current minimum
fee unless the fee function value is at or above its γ value.
In order to test the validity of the model, a game was
developed in Java, the code was made available at [22]
that simulates the interaction between the nodes who are
trying to get their transaction included into the block by
offering transaction fees. The exchange rate ϕ was fixed on
£0.00024490 per one Satoshi (0.00000001 BTC), and the fee
paying probability γ set at 7905978.559, as per the statistical
data found. Transactions are generated at random at the start
of the round and their worth is generated individually; after
this, the game is started and is only between the transactions
currently in the mempool. Competition between users con-
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tinues until the fees rise to the point, where no other users are
willing to pay it to get into the block, and the block is already
filled to maximum capacity – there is no time limit set to the
contest.
We conducted a game with a set block size of 4200tx
(2MB block), and 31596 new transactions coming into the
mempool at the start of each block interval, with the ’losing’
transactions being dropped and a new set generated at each
block interval, which, to model against Bitcoin, will occur
every 10min (or 600s). We repeated this game for 100 rounds
(i.e., 100 blocks were made), and collected an average fee
of 0.00034 BTC, which very closely matches the real life
average of 0.00033984 BTC. As noted at the start of Section
III, users in our model have perfect knowledge of all other
fee offerings in the network, therefore, the variance between
our fees is uniform; users have no reason to pay any more or
any less than is necessary for their transaction to be included,
so our median fee value is also 0.00034 BTC.
V. MODEL ANALYSIS
Other than the fee values and the utility of users, another
important variable that must be considered is the utility of the
whole network, i.e. the transactions still awaiting their con-
firmation in the mempool. Whilst having a high user utility is
important, this function only evaluates the utility of ’winner’
transactions, with the lower worth transaction having to hold
off and wait for another block cycle for possible success. This
is especially important as when the number of transactions
coming into the network each cycle increases, so does the
chance of a higher worth transaction coming in, and in turn,
being quickly approved over the previous transactions. To
evaluate network utility, at the end of each round we will
use the same utility function to calculate what the potential
utility of the every transaction in the mempool would be if
it got confirmed in the next block cycle; this value will be
contrasted against the utility of the ’winner’ users to more
accurately assess the overall utility of the system.
We begin our analysis by focusing on the effect that a block
size change has on the fees users are willing to pay - to start,
we analyse whether a block size change impacts the fees
being paid, even if the ratio of transactions coming in remains
the same. We will first take a static approach, that is, a set
number of transactions will enter the mempool, and once the
block cycle is over, all of the mempool will be discarded and
an entire new set of transactions will be created. According
to the results from Table 1, our model finds that although
the individual fees paid remain mostly identical, as the block
size increases (and there are more fee-paying transactions
inside a single block), so does the total in fees collected per
block. Whilst it might seem attractive for miners to lobby for
a bigger block size, in a practical environment, miners would
also have to juggle the increasing computational and storage
costs that an increase in the block size would incur. Another
reason for this might be that because there is a greater number
of transactions coming into the network, there is also an
increased chance for a more high worth transaction to come
BSL TX avg. fee in BTC avg. fee total per block
4200 (2MB) 15000 0.00000386 0.01619648
8400 (4MB) 30000 0.00000386 0.03240829
16800 (8MB) 60000 0.00000382 0.06410137
33600 (16MB) 120000 0.00000380 0.12761163
TABLE 1: The impact of different block sizes on fees paid
when the mempool ratio is the same
BSL TX avg. fee in BTC avg. fee total per block
4200 (2MB) 50000 0.00143655 6.03352840
8400 (4MB) 50000 0.00012440 1.04498434
16800 (8MB) 50000 0.00000050 0.00838363
33600 (16MB) 50000 0.00000002 0.00057073
TABLE 2: The impact of increasing block sizes when the
mempool levels are kept the same
into the mempool, thus they will offer more in fees.
Next, we will evaluate the effect that a block size change
has with the same number of transactions - for our purposes,
we will use a high number of 50,000 transactions so that a
wider extent of block sizes can be investigated. Tests were
conducted with block sizes ranging from 2MB (4200tx limit)
to 16MB (33600tx limit), and the model was simulated for
100 rounds each. Simulation results (Table 2) show that as
the block size increases, the competition levels between users
go down, and as a result, they don’t need to pay as much to
have their transactions confirmed. These results reflect quite
drastically both in terms of individual fees the users pay, and
the totals that the miners would receive - as the competition
decreases, so do the fees being offered.
To better simulate the real blockchain environment we will
now take a dynamic approach, where transactions that fail to
get into the next block are kept in the mempool, as this will
enable us to monitor various new factors, such as the utility of
the users and the network. We conducted similar simulations
as above, where to fairly compare different block sizes, we
kept the ratio of TX incoming identical - for a 2MB block,
each cycle contained 5000 new transactions, for a 4MB block
10000 transactions, for a 8MB block 20000 transactions,
and finally for a 16MB block 40000 new transactions. The
results in the dynamic game further prove our findings from
above - even though the average the competitiveness between
the users remained the same, as the number of transactions
coming in increased, so did the total in fees gained, signifying
a potential rise in profit for miners.
We were also able to analyse the utility of users, results
of which can be found in Figures 4 and 5: both the utility
of the ’winner’ transactions and of the whole network re-
mained fairly high throughout, which shows that even when
the mempool rises to significant amounts, the network can
still function at a high level. For a 2MB block the average
utility was 0.718, whilst the network utility was 0.625, in
a 4MB block it was 0.7 and 0.637, for 8MB it was 0.702
and 0.626, and for a 16MB block it was 0.742 and 0.624,
respectively. Although the utility remained at fairly constant
levels throughout, a telling trend that can be seen is that
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FIGURE 4: Average utility of transactions per block, depen-
dent on block size, shown from 2 MB to 16 MB
FIGURE 5: Average network utility per block, shown from 2
MB to 16 MB block size.
the overall network utility decreased as the mempool levels
rose, revealing that transactions end up waiting longer to get
approved as competitiveness increases. Another interesting
trend that can be seen from the simulations is that while the
average fees per block (figure 6) tended to increase as the
mempool levels rose, they were quite varied - meaning that it
might be beneficial for some users to simply wait out a more
competitive block cycle so they can potentially pay less in
fees in the next one.
VI. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
There are multiple fundamental issues concerning the pay-
your-bid fee mechanism, most severe of which is perhaps
the risk it poses to the stability of the whole blockchain
system: the arrival rate of transactions is volatile and un-
predictable, thus miners’ revenue is not stable. Without any
fixed block rewards to sustain miners, they must rely on
the mempool to contain, at all times, enough in fees to
afford the heavy electricity and computational costs involved
with block mining. Whilst high competition drives up the
fees, it risks the loss of users when the demand for block
space exceedingly surpasses supply; alternatively, too little
of competition, and miners are driven away because it is
not worth their investment for too little in reward. These
problems exist because miners are inherently profit-driven,
FIGURE 6: Average transaction fee per block, shown from 2
MB to 16 MB block size.
and are solely focused on their own utility rather than the
entirety of the network. Although miners cannot control the
arrival rate of transactions, they can make an independent
decision on the block size limit, and thus they have a role in
determining the overall competitiveness among blockchain
users.
In a practical environment, artificially forcing users to pay
more in fees is likely to end up being a futile attempt as it is
detrimental to both the miners and users interests, however,
our model moves away from this and simply generates a set
number of number transactions at the very start of the block
cycle. The results from the previous section have shown that
increasing the block size on account of a growing mempool
has positive effect for both the users, who not only pay less
in fees and get their transactions approved quicker, and the
miners who also in turn get to collect a higher reward total.
Since the utility function does not consider the fees a
user pays, users will pay non-zero fees since their focus
is delay/time, which, besides the block interval, is largely
dependent on mempool congestion. Furthermore, in such a
model users have no incentive to split their transactions into
multiple, smaller ones, since in such a case, their worth will
be lower with each individual transaction, and they’ll be
competing against their own transactions in the same block
cycle.
In a more practical setting, we would have to take into
consideration the individual characteristics of the miner; their
mining power, mining budget, attitude towards risk, etc.
What is an optimal block size for one miner is unlikely to be
for another, therefore, a fixed block size setting will be tricky
to set. Our analysis will abstract away from mining pools
– instead, we will focus on a single, honest and powerful
miner who purely aims to increase his own profit as much
as possible. We will also not consider the effects of the gap
game, and other security issues that come from having no
block rewards [23] - the gap game can be summarised as a
period of time where miners have no incentive to mine, as the
accumulation of possible revenue from mining is not enough
for a rational miner to begin expending their resources.
We begin our analysis by looking at the maximum fees the
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FIGURE 7: Maximum fees users are willing to pay, when
linearly increasing the mempool levels.
FIGURE 8: Maximum fees users are willing to pay, when
linearly increasing the block size.
users would be willing to offer (i.e. the worth of the proposed
transaction is set at maximum of 1), as we linearly increase
the block size: our model finds that as the competitions levels
are lowered, the fees the users would be willing to pay go
down as well, as shown in fig. 8. However, interestingly,
the total in fees collected in these blocks, as can be seen in
fig. 9, remains the same; ranging from 103.1607 to 103.162.
This is because theoretically, if the users are going to be
honest and pay their maximum possible fee, the block size
is inconsequential to the total revenue for miners. These
findings contradict previous research efforts, such as [3] and
[4], which concluded that artificially limiting the space inside
the block will increase miner revenue.
The variable that does largely determine the miners’ rev-
enue are the mempool levels; the more transactions there are
awaiting confirmation, the more the users will offer to pay.
These findings can be seen in Fig. 7, where we fixed the
block size at 4200 tx (2 MB block), and instead adjusted
the mempool levels, starting from just 100 tx to as many as
200,000 tx, and looked for the maximum fee users would be
willing pay; we find that as the mempool increases, so do the
fees the users are willing to pay, in turn increasing the fee
totals.
Therefore, our model shows that as long as the block size
is below the number of transactions awaiting confirmation,
FIGURE 9: Total in fees collected, when linearly increasing
the block size.
the revenue coming from fee totals will be the same for each
miner; the only thing that they have to consider is their own
personal costs of storage, combined with their social utility.
Since we assume all the transactions for the block interval
come at an instant at the start of the block cycle, miners
must determine themselves how many transactions they are
willing to confirm for the betterment of the whole network.
Of course, in the real world, miners would need to wait until
high worth transactions come in and bump up the fees for all
users, however, our research abstracts away from this.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Our findings show that in theory, the block size is trivial to
miners’ revenue; whether the block size is small or large
has no effect on fee totals. Instead, what matters are the
mempool levels. This further reinforces the importance of
the symbiotic relationship between miners and users; even
though miners stand to gain the same profits if they set the
block size extremely low (and thus save on storage costs),
in such an environment users are likely to be deterred from
using the service – thus lowering the mempool levels.
There are several pitfalls in our research; we assumed that
transactions are instantly available to each miner, rather than
coming in randomly or at some (Poisson) distribution. For
more practical analysis this would have to be crucial, as it
is unreasonable to expect high worth transactions to come in
regularly, to the point where they would be willing to pay
hundreds or even thousands of Pounds Sterling in fees. We
also ignored all security issues, and instead base our findings
on an idealistic world of a single, honest and fair miner.
As we covered in Section III.B, the fundamental basis
determining the fee a user is willing to offer is based on the
worth they attach to their individual transaction. There unfor-
tunately exists no real-life dataset that contains information
regarding the personal importance/urgency of transactions,
and such a value cannot be gathered from other transactional
data such as transactional amount [8]. Hence, whilst our work
is purely theoretical, we believe that it succeeds in furthering
the conversation in regards to the concerns that a zero-block
reward environment will bring to dwindling block reward
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systems such as Bitcoin in the future.
Changing the block size in an already active blockchain
system isn’t an easy task - such a move would require a
hard fork in the network, and would need an approval from
the majority (51%) of miners to be accepted. A larger block
size would also lead to increased bandwidth costs, longer
signature checking times, and higher storage costs, which
inadvertently raises the question of decentralisation, as the
more powerful miners (and mining pools) would yield a lot
of power in any such decision-making process.
However, if the adoption of Bitcoin continues to increase,
the service is unlikely to be viable for casual users, and
a potential solution is clear – to expand the block size in
response to the increased usage of Bitcoin as a payment
service. Such a change will allow its users to pay less in fees
(making micro-transactions viable in the network), whilst
also increasing the total in rewards gained by the miners.
Hard-coding the block size is problematic since we can-
not anticipate future mempool levels, therefore, a dynamic
approach that adjusts the block size (possibly within some
range) based on mempool congestion is our recommendation.
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